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Abstract— In this paper, we show that attackers can leak 
data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby 
smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed 
covert channel works even if a smartphone is kept inside a 
Faraday shielding case, which aims to block any type of 
inbound and outbound wireless communication (Wi-Fi, 
cellular, Bluetooth, etc.). The channel also works if the 
smartphone is set in 'airplane mode' in order to block any 
communication with the device.  
We implement a malware that controls the magnetic fields 
emanating from the computer by regulating workloads on 
the CPU cores. Sensitive data such as encryption keys, 
passwords, or keylogging data is encoded and transmitted 
over the magnetic signals. A smartphone located near the 
computer receives the covert signals with its magnetic 
sensor. We present technical background, and discuss 
signal generation, data encoding, and signal reception. We 
show that the proposed covert channel works from a user-
level process, without requiring special privileges, and can 
successfully operate from within an isolated virtual 
machine (VM).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Magnetic sensors (also known as magnetometers) in 
smartphones and tablets are mainly used for orientation and 
positioning. Unlike cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and NFC 
hardware, magnetic sensors are not considered communication 
interfaces. Thus, they can be accessed with basic permissions 
and remain active even in airplane mode, where all wireless 
communication interfaces are disabled. 
 
In this paper, we show how attackers can maliciously utilize a 
smartphone’s magnetic sensors in order to exfiltrate 
information from isolated, non-networked (air-gapped) 
computers. In this attack, a malware on the air-gapped 
computer gathers sensitive data and transmits it via magnetic 
fields generated from the CPU cores. The covert magnetic 
signals are then received by a smartphone located in close 
proximity to the computer. The data received is decoded and 
sent to the attacker via the Internet (e.g., Wi-Fi or cellular data). 
 
A. Air-Gap Covert Channels 
An air-gapped network is a secured computer network in which 
security measures are taken to maintain physical separation 
from public networks such as the Internet. Such security 
measures taken may include separation of network equipment, 
using physical access control to systems, banning unauthorized 
hardware and so on. But despite of these restrictions, several 
incidents in the last decade has shown that air-gapped networks 
are not immune to malware infections [1][2][3]. For example, 
In 2017, WikiLeaks published a reference to a tool dubbed 
'Brutal Kangaroo,' allegedly used to infiltrate air-gapped 
computers via external USB drives [4]. Using such techniques, 
attackers can breach the network and bypass security measures 
such intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems 
(IDS/IPS). In order to exfiltrate data from the compromised air-
gapped, networkless, computer, attackers must leak the data 
through special types of covert channels known as air-gap 
covert channels. Over the years, several types of air-gap covert 
channels have been proposed based on electromagnetic [5–9], 
acoustic [10] [11] [12], optical [13] [14], and thermal [15] 
emanations from the computer. In this paper, we propose a 
magnetic covert channel between air-gapped computers (e.g., 
workstation) and smartphone located nearby. Note that the 
covert channel requires that malicious code is run on both sides: 
on the air-gapped computer and the adjacent smartphone. 
 
B. Our Contribution 
We introduce a new type of covert communication between air-
gapped computers and nearby smartphones. Although the 
proposed covert channel is limited in terms of distance and 
speed, it has unique characteristics: 
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Availability. The hardware used for the covert communication 
exists in virtually all modern computers and smartphones; the 
CPU used for the transmission is a fundamental component of 
any computer, and the magnetic sensors used for the reception 
are an integral part of any modern smartphone or tablet.  
 
Required privileges. The malicious codes executed in the 
computer and smartphone require no special privileges (e.g., 
root or admin) and can operate from an ordinary user-level 
process or app.  
 
The proposed covert channel even functions in constrained 
environments where other types of wireless communication are 
blocked: 
  
 Faraday shielding. Computers and smartphones in secure 
areas might be kept in Faraday shielding or a Faraday case 
to prevent any type of wireless communication to/from the 
device. Nevertheless, the low frequency magnetic fields 
used in our covert channel can bypass Faraday shielding.    
 
 Airplane mode.  In some secure zones a smartphone might 
be set in airplane mode. In this mode all types of wireless 
communication interfaces in the device (Wi-Fi, cellular, 
Bluetooth, etc.) are disabled, however the magnetic sensors 
in smartphones are not considered communication 
interfaces, and hence remain active even in airplane mode.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II we 
present related work. Section III provides technical 
background. Section IV describes the attack model. The 
transmission and reception are described in Sections V and VI. 
In Section VII we present the analysis and evaluation. We 
discuss countermeasures in Section VIII, and we conclude in 
Section IX. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Air-gap covert channels can be classified into five main 
categories: electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, thermal, and 
optical.  
In the past twenty years, several studies have proposed the use 
of electromagnetic emanation from computers for covert 
communication. In 1998, Kuhn and Anderson [6] showed that 
attackers can control the electromagnetic emissions from  
computer displays. In this study a malicious code generated 
radio signals in the AM band and encoded binary data on them. 
Thiele [16] presented a program dubbed 'Tempest for Eliza,' 
which used the VGA cable to transmit the song 'letter to Alice' 
played on the AM radio signals. In 2014, Guri et al introduced 
AirHopper [5], [17], malware that can leak data from air-
gapped networks to a nearby smartphone using electromagnetic 
signals in the FM radio band emanating from the video cable. 
Guri et al also presented GSMem [9], malware that leaks data 
from air-gapped computers using frequencies in the GSM, 
UMTS, and LTE band emitted from the RAM buses. Their 
method used a multi-channel memory architecture to generate 
an amplified signal, which was received by a rootkit placed on 
the baseband firmware of a compromised mobile phone. In 
2016, Guri et al demonstrated a method dubbed USBee that 
uses the USB connectors to generate covert electromagnetic 
signals from PCs [18].  
Sound waves offer another way of leaking data from air-gapped 
computers. Hanspach proposed using ultrasonic sound to 
transmit data between laptops with speakers and microphones 
[12]. However, this method is only relevant when speakers and 
microphones are present. In 2016, Guri et al demonstrated 
Fansmitter [10] and DiskFiltration [11], two methods enabling 
exfiltration of data via specially generated sound waves when 
the air-gapped computers are not equipped with speakers. The 
binary data is encoded on top of noise emitted from the PC fans 
and hard disk drive mechanical arm.  
Data can also be leaked from air-gapped computers optically. 
Loughry and Umphress proposed using the PC keyboard LEDs 
(caps-lock, num-lock and scroll-lock) to modulate data [19]. In 
2017, Guri et al presented a covert channel that uses the hard 
drive indicator LED [13] and router LEDs [20] in order to leak 
data from air-gapped computers and networks. VisiSploit [21] 
is another optical covert channel in which data is leaked through 
fast blinking images or low contrast bitmaps projected on the 
computer screen. Lopes et al proposed using external USB 
devices implanted with IR LEDs to exfiltrate data  [22]. In 
2017, Guri et al presented aIR-Jumper, a method that uses the 
IR LEDs in security cameras to exfiltrate and infiltrate air-
gapped networks remotely [14]. Their method enabled 
bidirectional communication between a remote attacker and 
malware inside the organizational network.  
 
In 2015, Guri et al demonstrated a thermal covert channel 
referred to as BitWhisper [15]. In this technique, an attacker can 
establish bidirectional communication between two adjacent 
air-gapped computers using temperature manipulation. The 
heat is generated by the CPU of one PC and received by 
temperature sensors that exist in the motherboard of the other 
PC. 
A. Magnetic 
Myhayun et al suggested using magnetic hard disk drives to 
generate magnetic emission, which can be received by a nearby 
smartphone magnetic sensor [23]. The smartphone needs to be 
located just a few centimeters from the transmitting laptop, and 
the bitrate varies from 0.067 bit/sec to 2 bit/sec. Recently, Guri 
et al presented ODINI [24], a malware that can exfiltrate data 
from air-gapped computers via low frequency magnetic signals 
generated by the computer’s CPU cores. They also showed that 
the low frequency magnetic fields can bypass Faraday cages. 
Their attack model requires an implanted magnetic receiver 
('bug') in the proximity of the transmitting Faraday-caged air-
gapped computer. The attack model presented in our paper is 
similar to [23] in terms of the reception, since it exploits a 
nearby infected smartphone. However, in the current research 
we adapt the signal generation process used by Guri et al in 
[24]. The specific ways in which our method differs from [23] 
and [24] are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Comparison with other magnetic covert channels 
Work Signal 
generation 
Receiver Max 
bit-
rate 
Max distance 
ODINI [24] CPU cores magnetic 
sensor 
40 
bit/sec 
100 to 150 cm 
MAGNETO 
(this paper) 
CPU cores smartphone 5 - 0.2 
bit/sec 
0 to 12 cm 
(desktops) 
Hard Disk 
Drive ([23]) 
Hard Disk 
Drive 
(magnetic) 
 
smartphone 2 - 0.06 
bit/sec 
 
0 to 12 cm 
(laptops) 
 
 
Unlike [23] which requires a magnetic hard disk drive, our 
method use the CPU hence works on any computer. In addition, 
in this paper we focus on an attack model relevant for air-
gapped workstations. Thus, we evaluated the covert channel on 
desktop workstations rather than laptop computers used in [23].  
 
Table 2 summarizes the existing air-gap covert channels, 
including the magnetic ones. 
 
 
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
Magnetic fields are produced whenever a charge is in motion, 
e.g., when current flows through a wire. A magnetic field at a 
given point is specified by its direction and strength, and is 
mathematically represented by a vector field.  The intensity of 
magnetic fields is measured in teslas (T). One tesla is defined 
as the field intensity generating one newton (N) of force per 
ampere (A) of current per meter of conductor. Note that a 
magnetic field of one tesla is very strong, and magnetic fields 
are commonly measured in units of milliteslas (1mT = 10-3T) 
or microteslas (1µT=10-9T).  
 
Ampère's Law shows that the strength of a magnetic field is 
proportional to the current flow in a wire. The main 
disadvantage of the magnetic field is that the strength of a 
magnetic field is inversely proportional to the third power of 
the distance (1/r³) from the magnet's center [25]. This 
characteristic limits the distance of magnetic communication 
compared to the distance achieved with electromagnetic 
communication [26]. In practice, magnetic fields are used for 
the establishment of short-range wireless communication 
between devices that are close to one another - a technique 
commonly referred to as Near-Field Magnetic Induction 
communication [27].  
A. Smartphone Magnetomers 
Magnetic sensors (magnetometers) are integrated into almost 
all modern smartphones and tablets. Their main functionality is 
to measure the earth's magnetic fields in order to detect the 
orientation of the phone in a three-dimensional space. A typical 
magnetometer contains three magnetic sensors (for the three 
perpendicular axes X, Y, and Z). Magnetometer chips 
commonly include a built-in accelerometer that helps adjust the 
measurements of the magnetic sensor.  
 
There are a few types of magnetometers used in consumer-
grade smartphones. The Hall effect sensor is the most 
commonly used magnetometer in smartphones and tablets [28]. 
This kind of sensor produces voltage when the sensor is placed 
in a strong magnetic field perpendicular to its plane. The 
voltage produced is proportional to the strength of the magnetic 
field. The voltage sensed is then converted to a signal 
representing the magnetic field intensity in telsas. Other types 
of magnetometers that are less common in mobile devices 
include the giant magnetoresistance (GMR), anisotropic 
magnetoresistance (AMR), and the magnetic tunneling junction 
(MTJ) magnetometers. The work in [29] provides a 
comprehensive explanation of the principles of these magnetic 
sensors. The magnetometers in modern smartphones have a 
resolution in the tens of µT and sampling rates between 50Hz 
and 150Hz.  
IV. ATTACK MODEL 
The attack model consists of three steps: infection of an air-
gapped network, infection of a smartphone, and data exfiltration. 
In the first step, one node in the air-gapped network is 
contaminated, possibly through removable media, outsourced 
software, or hardware components. Note that several of the 
APTs discovered in the last decade were capable of infecting air-
gapped networks [30] (e.g., Turla [31], Red October [32], and 
Fanny [33]). The malware should then propagate itself across 
the network, possibly targeting specific computers according to 
a given criteria. In the second step, the smartphone of a targeted 
employee is located, and the receiver application is installed on 
Table 2. Summary of existing air-gap covert channels 
Type Method 
Electromagnetic AirHopper [4], [11] 
GSMem [15] 
USBee [24] 
Funthenna [25] 
Magnetic MAGNETO (this paper) 
ODINI [24] 
Myhayun (hard disk drive [38]) 
Acoustic Fansmitter (computer fan noise) 
[27] 
DiskFiltration (hard disk noise) [28] 
Thermal BitWhisper [35] 
Optical  
 
 
 
 
Infrared (IR) 
LED-it-GO (hard drive LED) [30] 
VisiSploit (invisible pixels) [32] 
Keyboard LEDs [29] 
Router LEDs [31] 
 
aIR-Jumper (security cameras & 
infrared) [34] 
Implanted infrared LEDs [33] 
 
the smartphone. The device can be infected via email 
attachments, compromised websites, or malicious app 
downloads. When the first two steps are accomplished, the 
attack enters its exfiltration phase. Although employees are 
assumed to carry their mobile phones around the workplace, the 
devices are often placed on a desk near the user's computer. The 
malicious program lies undetected within the targeted computer, 
gathering sensitive data when possible. The data might be 
keylogging data, encryption keys, credential tokens, or 
passwords. The malware then leaks the data via the magnetic 
emanation generated from the CPU. Concurrently, the malicious 
app on the phone scans the magnetic field for the signal denoting 
an incoming data transmission. When the signals are received 
and decoded, the data can be forwarded by the smartphone to the 
attacker's computer encrypted via Wi-Fi. 
It is important to note that the mobile phone's owner is not 
necessarily a malicious insider; the device may be contaminated 
by an “evil maid” attack in which an individual tampers with a 
device temporarily left unattended, without the owner's consent 
or knowledge. 
 
Figure 1 presents a typical leakage scenario in which an 
employee’s smartphone is placed on the desk near the infected 
computer. Covert magnetic signals are transmitted over the air-
gap and received by the malicious app in the smartphone. Data 
is decoded and sent encrypted to the attacker via Wi-Fi. 
 
V. TRANSMISSION 
As described in the technical background section, moving 
charges in a wire generate a magnetic field. The magnetic field 
changes according to the acceleration of the charges in the wire. 
In a standard computer, the wires that supply electricity from 
the main power supply to the motherboard are the primary 
source of the magnetic emanation. The CPU is one of the largest 
consumers of power in the motherboard. Since modern CPUs 
are energy efficient, the momentary workload of the CPU 
directly affects the dynamic changes in its power consumption 
[34]. By regulating the workload of the CPU, it is possible to 
govern its power consumption, and hence to control the 
magnetic field generated. In the most basic case, overloading 
the CPU with calculations will consume more current and 
generate a stronger magnetic field. By intentionally starting and 
stopping the CPU workload, we can generate a magnetic field 
at the required frequency and modulate binary data over it.  
To generate a carrier wave at frequency 𝑓𝑐 in one or more cores, 
we control the utilization of the CPU at a frequency correlated 
to 𝑓𝑐 . To that end, 𝑛 worker threads are created, where each 
thread is bound to a specific core. To generate the carrier wave, 
each worker thread repeatedly overloads its core at 
frequency  𝑓𝑐 . That is, each thread applies a continuous 
workload on its core (full power consumption) for a time period 
of 1/2𝑓𝑐  and then puts its core in an idle state (low power 
consumption) for a time period of 1/2𝑓𝑐. The basic operation 
of a worker thread is described in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
 
A worker thread receives the core to be bound to (iCore) and 
the carrier frequency (freq). It also receives the number of 
cycles for the modulation of the logical '0' (nCycles0) and 
logical '1' (nCycles1). Note that the cycle time is derived from 
the frequency of the carrier wave (line 3). The thread function 
iterates on the array of bits to transmit. In the case of a logical 
'0' it sleeps for nCycles0 cycles. In the case of a logical '1' it 
repeatedly starts and stops the workload of the core at the carrier 
frequency freq for nCycles1 cycles. We overload the core using 
the busy waiting technique. This function causes full utilization 
of the core for the time period using a busy loop and then 
returns.  
 
A. Data Modulation 
We implemented two data modulation schemes for the 
transmission which are described below: on-off keying (OOK) 
and binary frequency-shift keying (B-FSK). We denote the 
number of cores available for the transmission as 𝑁𝑐. 
 
1) On-off keying 
In OOK modulation, the data is represented by the presence and 
absence of the carrier wave. The presence of a carrier wave 
 
Figure 1.  An exfiltration scenario in which data is modulated 
over a covert magnetic field emanating from the air-gapped 
computer; the data is received by a nearby smartphone.  
 
represents the symbol '1,' while its absence represents the 
symbol '0' (Table 3). Note that in our covert channel, the 
amplitude of the carrier wave is unknown to the receiver in 
advance, and it mainly depends on the type of transmitting 
computer used, the number of cores participating in the 
transmission, and the distance between the transmitter and the 
receiver. These parameters are synchronized with the receiver 
during the preamble and bit-framing described later. 
  
 
Table 3. On-off keying 
Symbol Carrier wave # of cores 
0 Present 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑐 
1 Absent 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑐 
 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the waveform of a 
binary sequence ('10101010') modulated with OOK and 
transmitted from a desktop PC with four cores. In this case, the 
smartphone was located at a distance of 5cm from the 
transmitting computer; the noise level is ~57.3µT, and the 
carrier wave amplitude is ~57.9µT. 
 
1) Binary Frequency-Shift Keying 
In frequency-shift keying (FSK) the data is represented by a 
change in the frequency of a carrier wave. Recall that the 
transmitting code can determine the frequency of the signal by 
setting the cycle time in the signal generation algorithm. In 
FSK, each frequency is represented by a different symbol. 
Table 4 contains a case in which we encode the two symbols '0' 
and '1' by the two frequencies 𝐹0 and 𝐹1. 
 
Table 4. Frequency-shift keying   
Symbol Frequency # of cores 
0 𝐹0 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑐 
1 𝐹1 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑐 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the time-frequency spectrogram of a binary 
sequence ('0101') modulated with FSK as transmitted from a 
PC with four cores. In this modulation, the frequencies 0.25Hz 
and 0.5Hz have been used to encode the symbols '0' and '1' 
respectively. The receiving smartphone is located 5cm from the 
transmitting computer. 
Bit-Framing 
The data is delivered in small frames of 40 bits comprised of a 
preamble, a payload, and a CRC, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Preamble 
(4 bits) 
Payload 
(32 bits) 
CRC 
(4 bits) 
Figure 4. Bit-framing. 
   
 Preamble. The preamble is transmitted at the beginning of 
every packet. It consists of a sequence of four alternating 
symbols ('1010') which helps the receiver determine the 
properties of the channel, such as the carrier wave 
frequency and amplitudes. Note that these properties are 
dependent on the distance of the smartphone from the 
transmitter, and hence might change during the 
transmission. In addition, the preamble header allows the 
receiver to detect the beginning of the transmission of each 
packet.  
 
 Payload. The payload is the raw binary data to be 
transmitted. We choose 32 bits as the payload size. 
 
 CRC. For error detection, we insert four bits of CRC code 
at the end of the frame. The receiver calculates the CRC 
for the received payload, and if it differs from the received 
CRC, an error is detected.  
 
Figure 3. The waveform of a binary sequence ('10101010') 
modulated with OOK. 
 
 
Figure 2. FSK modulation of a binary sequence ('1010') with two 
frequencies (0.25Hz and 0.5Hz).  
 
VI. RECEPTION 
In this section, we briefly discuss the implementation details 
and design considerations for the receiver side.  
We implemented the receiver as an Android application. We 
access the magnetic sensor through the 
android.hardware.Sensor class [35] to create an 
instance of the Sensor.TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD. The 
application samples the magnetic field with the fastest 
sampling rate available on the device (using the 
SensorManager.SENSOR_DELAY_FASTEST settings). 
The magnetic sensor provides the field strength in three axes 
(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧); we calculate the field strength by the norm of the 
vector √(𝑥2 + 𝑦2 + 𝑧2). Reception of the transmitted data is 
based on three main steps: 
 Signal Sampling. Sampling the magnetic field and 
filtering the signal. 
 Preamble Detection. Searching for a frame header. 
 Demodulation. Demodulating the frame’s payload.  
The SensorSample() event handler is invoked when the 
sensor has new data. The handler has three possible states: 
SAMPLE, PREAMBLE, and DEMODULATE. In the 
SAMPLE state the code measures the magnetic field. In the 
PREAMBLE state it searches for a bit-frame header to identify 
the beginning of a new frame. In the DEMODUALTE state the 
actual signal demodulation occurs. The outline of the receiver 
app is presented in Algorithm 2. 
 
 
 
 
Signal Sampling. The first step is to measure the signal in a 
carrier wave 𝑓𝑐. Note that this step includes performing a fast 
Fourier transform on the sampled signal. Although we assume 
that the 𝑓𝑐  is known to the receiver in advance, more 
complicated implementation may include a preliminary phase 
for scanning the carrier wave 𝑓𝑐. The signal measured is stored 
in a buffer after applying a moving average filter for noise 
mitigation (lines 1-5). This data is used later in the 
demodulation routines. The noise mitigation function is applied 
to the current sample by averaging it with the last 𝑊 original 
samples. 
Preamble Detection. In the PREAMBLE state the receiver 
searches for a preamble sequence to identify a frame header 
(lines 7-11). If the preamble sequence ‘1010’ is detected, the 
state is changed to DEMODULATE to initiate the 
demodulation process (lines 12-18). Based on the preamble 
sequence, the receiver determines the ‘1’ and ‘0’ amplitude 
levels and the signals’ duration.   
Demodulation. In the DEMODULATION state the payload is 
demodulated given the signal parameters retrieved in the 
PREAMBLE state. The demodulated bit is added to the current 
payload. If the full payload is received, the algorithm moves 
back to the preamble detection state (PREAMBLE).  
The function SignalLost() returns true if, during the data 
reception, the signal power measured is weaker than the 
amplitude of the ‘0’s from the preamble for three seconds 
straight. In this case, any partially received data is discarded or 
marked appropriately, and the algorithm returns to the 
PREAMBLE state. Signal loss may occur if the malware stops 
the transmission (e.g., for stealth or due to the computer 
shutting down). Signal loss may also occur if the smartphone 
has been moved away from the computer and lost the signal. 
VII. ANALYSIS AND EVALUTION 
In this section we present the evaluation of the covert channel. 
For testing we use the Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone (GT-
I9505). This model is shipped with the Yamaha YAS532B 
sensor [36] which is a 3-axis geomagnetic sensor chip 
integrated into the smartphone board. It has a sensitivity of 0.15 
µT in the X and Y axes and a sensitivity of 0.25 µT in the Z 
axis. The experimental setup consists of a standard desktop PC 
as described in Table 5. The systems in the experiments were 
running Linux Ubuntu version 16.04 64-bit. 
 
Table 5. Workstation used in the experiments 
# Model Motherboard/board CPU Cores 
PC Infinity 
desktop PC 
Gigabyte H87M-
D3H 
Intel Core i7-
4770 CPU @ 
3.4GHz 
4 cores (8 
virtual 
cores) 
 
A. Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) 
In digital communication the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
measures the signal strength relative to the background noise. 
The ratio is measured in decibels (dB) using a signal-to-noise 
ratio formula of SNR=10𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙/𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒). We measured 
the level of the signal and noise from a smartphone located near 
a transmitting computer (PC). In these tests, we transmitted a 
signal consisting of a sequence of alternating bits (010101…) 
for a duration of 20 seconds. We measured the signal from 
distances of 0 to 15cm.  
 
The measurement results are presented in Figure 5. As can be 
seen, the strength of the magnetic signal significantly decreases 
as the distance increases. At a distance of 0cm (the left Y-axis), 
the smartphone receives signals at levels of ~109.7µT (on 
average), while the background noise levels are ~108.5µT. At 
this distance the SNR level is 14.902dB. For distances of 5cm, 
10cm, and 15cm (the right Y-axis), the SNR levels are 
17.879dB, 12.420dB, and 10.240dB, respectively. For more 
than 15cm, the levels of the background noise were stronger 
than those of the signal; therefore, we stopped taking 
measurements at a distance of 15cm. Note that that SNR 
measured at close proximity (0cm) is lower than the SNR 
measured from 5cm. The lower SNR at 0cm is due to other 
magnetic fields emanating from the computer (e.g., the power 
supply), which interfere with our signal.  
 
B. Bit Error Rate (BER) 
We measured the bit error rate (BER) of the covert channel for 
distances ranging from 0 to 15cm between a transmitting 
computer (PC) and a smartphone. For the BER measurements, 
we used simple OOK modulation. Our tests include three 
transmission rates: 0.2 bit/sec, 1 bit/sec, and 5 bit/sec. The 
results are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. BER at various distances  
 1cm 5cm 10cm 12.5cm 15cm 
0.2 bit/sec 0% 0% 0% 10% 30% 
1 bit/sec 0% 0% 20% 20% >30% 
5 bit/sec 0% 20% 30% >30% >30% 
 
We were only able to achieve a transmission rate of 5 bit/sec 
with 0% BER when the smartphone was in very close proximity 
of the transmitting computer (0-3 cm). Increasing the distance 
was found to compromise both the transmission rate and the 
BER; for example, at a distance of 12.5cm from the transmitting 
computer, the transmission rate of 1 bit/sec was accompanied 
by a high BER of 20%. With a slow transmission rate of 0.2 
bit/sec, we were able to reach a distance of 12.5 cm with a BER 
of 10%. Based on these results we conclude that the covert 
channel is only relevant for the exfiltration of a small amount 
of data such as encryption keys and passwords. Given the 
limited distances and bitrates, a transmission rate of 1 bit/sec is 
the most practical among the various options given the trade-
offs.   
C. Interference 
The thread that generates the magnetic signals shares the CPU 
time with other processes in the operating system. We 
examined whether the activity of various processes interferes 
with signal generation. For this evaluation, we ran the 
transmitting process while employing four types of workloads 
common to desktop PCs which are described below: 
 
 Idle. Only the default processes are running in the 
background. 
 Word processing. The LibreOffice editor [37] is open, and 
the user is editing a document. 
 Video playing. The VLC media player [38] is playing a 
movie clip.  
 CPU intensive calculations. Linux matho-primes [39] is 
performing the calculations of large prime numbers. 
Table 7. SNR with various workloads 
Workload Application/Process SNR (dB) 
Idle  Background 
processes 
9.042 
 
Word processing  LibreOffice Writer 8.990 
Video playing VLC media player 7.590 
Calculations matho-primes 3.430 
 
Table 7 summarizes the SNR measured at a distance of 5cm 
from the transmitting computer for each of the four workloads. 
We used eight threads for the transmission of an alternating bit 
sequence ('10101010') using OOK modulation. As can be seen, 
the word processing and video playing result in just slightly 
more interference than that of the idle state. The main reason 
for this is the low amount of CPU utilization consumed by word 
processing and video playing. However, the intensive 
computational process  associated with matho-primes results in 
a noticeable amount of background noise and reduces the SNR 
levels to ~3.4dB. Based on this we conclude that the covert 
channel will be more effective at times in which the 
transmitting computer is not performing CPU bound 
workloads.  
 
D. Virtual Machines 
Virtualization technologies are widely used in modern IT 
environments (e.g., private and public clouds, and the 
 
Figure 5. Signal measurements at distances of 0 to 15cm. 
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virtualization systems of desktops and servers). One of the 
advantages of virtualization is the resource isolation it provides. 
Virtual machine monitors (VMM), also referred to as 
hypervisors, provide a separation between the guest operating 
system and the hardware resources. We examined the 
operability of a transmitter running in a virtualized environment 
with the primary goal of determining whether the virtualization 
layer causes interruptions or delays that affect signal 
generation. 
 
Figure 6-top (tests with four cores) and 6-bottom (tests with 
eight cores) show the waveforms of signals as measured by a 
smartphone located 3cm away from the PC. The blue signals 
were generated from the host computer, and the red signals 
were generated from within a VMware virtual machine. Both 
signals represent the transmission of the alternating sequence 
(101010…) using OOK modulation. The guest and host 
computers were running Linux Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit. We used 
VMware Workstation Player 14.0 for the virtualization and 
configured the host machine to support all available processors. 
As can be seen, the magnetic signals generated from within the 
VMs are similar to the magnetic signals generated directly from 
the host computer. For four cores, the SNR for both signals 
(host and VM) is about 6.3dB. For eight cores, the SNR for both 
signals is about 9dB. Note that we experienced no time delay or 
reduction in signal strength when transmitting from a VM.   
E. Number of Cores  
 
Figure 7. The signal generated from 1, 2, 4, and 8 cores. 
 
As described in [24] the number of cores used for the 
transmission influences the currency flow, and hence the 
strength of the generated signal (i.e., the use of more 
transmitting cores yields a stronger signal). Figure 7 presents 
the waveforms of the alternating sequence (101010…) 
transmitted with 1, 2, 4, and 8 threads. In these tests, each thread 
was bound to a different core. As expected, the use of more 
cores yields higher SNR values: the measured SNR for 1, 2, 4, 
and 8 cores was 7.83dB, 10.64dB, 15.17dB, and 15.19dB, 
respectively. 
F. Faraday Bags for Smartphones 
Faraday bags serve as small Faraday cages for handheld devices 
such as smartphones and tablets  [40]. They are primarily aimed 
at blocking any inbound or outbound RF (radio frequency) 
activity to/from the device, including transmission and 
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Figure 6. The waveforms of the signals transmitted from a PC (VM / Host) with four cores (top) and eight cores (bottom)  
 
 
reception of cellular, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GPS, RFID, and NFC 
signals (Error! Reference source not found.). However, the 
magnetic covert channel proposed in this paper works even if 
the smartphone is kept inside a Faraday shielding case. In the 
proposed covert channel, we generate magnetic fields at 
frequencies lower than 50Hz. Such low frequency magnetic 
waves can propagate through metal, concrete, and soil [45][41]. 
As shown in [24] even the use of 3mm metal shields is 
ineffective for low frequency magnetic fields.  
 
Figure 8 shows the successful reception of a signal when the 
smartphone is stored inside and outside an enclosed faraday 
bag. In this test, the smartphone is placed 7 cm from the 
transmitting PC. As can be seen, the magnetic signals bypass 
the Faraday bag and are successfully received by the 
smartphone. The SNR is 5.6dB when the smartphone is placed 
inside the Faraday bag and 7.2dB when the smartphone is 
located outside the case.  
` 
G. Stealth 
The transmitting program leaves only a small footprint in the 
memory, making its presence easier to hide from AVs. At the 
OS level, the transmitting program requires no special or 
elevated privileges (e.g., root or admin), and hence can be 
initiated from an ordinary user space process. The transmitting 
code consists mainly of basic CPU operations such as busy 
loops, which do not expose malicious behavior, making it 
highly evasive from automated analysis tools. The receiver 
application on the smartphone side does not require root access 
and can be installed as a simple app with a basic permission to 
access the magnetic field sensor; this is true in both Google 
Android and Apple iOS devices [35][42]. With regard to the 
attack model, this means that the malicious app can be delivered 
via the app market. Such an app will likely be able to evade 
static and dynamic detection tools, since the access to the 
magnetic field sensor is considered safe in terms of privacy and 
security. 
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES 
A. Detection  
Covert channel detection can be handled by security systems 
running in the computer or smartphone. In this approach, 
security solutions continuously trace the processes' activities 
and try to detect malicious operations. In the case of the 
proposed magnetic covert channel, a thread (or group of 
threads) that manipulate the CPU workload is tagged as 
suspicious. However, many kinds of applications use working 
threads that affect the processor workload, and this detection 
approach will likely suffer from a high rate of false alarms. 
Another problem is that the signal generation code involves 
only simple, non-privileged CPU operations (e.g., busy loops), 
without requiring special instructions or specialized API calls. 
Tracing non-privileged CPU operations at runtime requires that 
the processes be in step by step mode, which can severely 
degrade system performance [9].  
 
Software-based detection also suffers from an inherent 
weakness in that it can be easily bypassed by malware. Static 
and dynamic detection of a malicious app in a smartphone is 
known to be a challenging task due to the wide range of code 
obfuscation and sandbox evasion techniques [43][44]. 
Moreover, apps that request access to the magnetic sensor are 
very common (e.g., for positioning and orientation), and 
therefore they cannot automatically be classified as malicious.     
 
Another approach for detecting the covert channel is based on 
monitoring the magnetic field in the area of the computer. The 
magnetic field is analyzed to find hidden transmissions or 
deviations. Note that finding anomalies in the magnetic and 
electromagnetic spectrum may also suffer from a high rate of 
false positives [45][46]. 
 
 
Figure 9. A smartphone in a Faraday bag receives the 
magnetic signals from a transmitting computer nearby. 
 
 
Figure 8. The signal received with a smartphone placed inside 
and outside a Faraday bag  
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B. Prevention 
There are three different approaches that can be used to prevent 
attackers from establishing the proposed magnetic covert 
channel: shielding, jamming, and zoning. 
 
Shielding. Magnetic shielding for computers is considered 
impractical except when used for special military or scientific 
purposes [47]. For effective magnetic shielding, special 
ferromagnetic materials such as mu-metal  should be used [48]. 
However, even with ferromagnetic material it is difficult to 
provide effective magnetic shielding against low frequency 
magnetic fields [47].  
 
Signal Jamming. In this approach, a strong signal is generated 
in the vicinity of the computer so that it interferes with 
unauthorized communications. Commercial magnetic field 
generators such as the compact magnetic field generator and 
analyzer MGA 1030 can generate a magnetic field at a strength 
of up to 1000 A/m at low frequencies (below to 1kHz) [49]. The 
power of such a magnetic field is hundreds of times stronger 
than the magnetic field generated by the CPU, so it overrides 
the CPU’s magnetic signals. Software-level signal jamming 
involves the execution of background processes that initiate 
random magnetic transmissions, and these random signals will 
interfere with the transmissions of the malicious process. 
However, random workloads reduce system performance and 
may be infeasible in some environments. 
 
Zoning. Procedural countermeasures involve the physical 
separation of emanating equipment from potential receivers. 
For example, the NATO SDIP-27 and SDIP-28 standards 
define separate zones in which electronic equipment is allowed 
[50]. In these standards, sensitive computers are kept in 
restricted areas in which certain equipment is banned. In our 
case, smartphones should be banned from close proximity to 
the sensitive computers. 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we show how attackers can exfiltrate information 
from air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via magnetic 
signals. Recent work shows how magnetic signals can be 
generated from computers by regulating the CPU workload 
[24]. We introduce smartphones to the attack model and show 
that the magnetic signals can be received by a nearby 
smartphone via its magnetic sensors. We implement a malware 
that can control the magnetic fields emanating from the 
computer and evaluate the signal reception at various distances 
and bitrates. Our results show that the covert channel is 
effective for short distances (12.5cm) and operates at low 
bitrates (<5 bit/sec). However, the covert channel is effective in 
constrained environments where all wireless communication is 
blocked, e.g., when the smartphone is kept in a Faraday bag or 
configured in airplane mode. We also show that the malicious 
code can operate from within an isolated virtual machine and 
does not require special privileges for its execution.  
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